跨太平洋夥伴關係協議

跨太平洋夥伴關係協定（英語：Trans-Pacific Partnership，簡稱TPP）是12個經濟體之間擬議的自由貿易協定，由汶莱、加拿大、智利、日本、马来西亚、墨西哥、新西兰、秘鲁、新加坡、越南和美国於2016年2月4日簽署。2017年1月，美国总统唐納·川普上任後宣布退出TPP。^[5]

跨太平洋夥伴關係協定

2010年TPP峰會
類型	自由貿易協定
起草完成日	2015年10月5日，​8年前​（2015-10-05）^[1]^[2]^[3]
簽署日	2016年2月4日，​7年前​（2016-02-04）
簽署地點	新西蘭奧克蘭
生效日	無效
生效條件	Ratification by all original signatories, or (2 years after signature) ratification by at least 6 states corresponding to 85% of GDP of original signatories^[4]
簽署者	11  澳大利亞  文莱  加拿大  智利  日本  马来西亚  墨西哥  新西蘭  秘魯  新加坡  越南
批准者	2  日本  新西蘭
保存處	紐西蘭
語言	英語（如果存在衝突或分歧，以英語版本為準）、西班牙語、越南語、日語、法語
收錄於维基文库的條約原文
《跨太平洋夥伴關係協定》

該協定未能按要求獲得批准，因此也沒有生效。其餘經濟體談判達成一項名為CPTPP的新貿易協定，該協定包含了TPP大部分條款，並於2018年12月30日生效。

TPP始於汶萊、智利、新西蘭和新加坡於2005年的TPSEP。隨後澳大利亞、加拿大、日本、馬來西亞、墨西哥、秘魯、美國和越南從2008年開始加入討論，使談判方達到十二個。2017年1月，美國退出該協議。^[6]

美國之外的TPP其餘各方於2017年5月同意重振TPP協議^[7][8]，並於2018年1月達成協議。

2018年3月，11方簽署協議修訂版，稱為跨太平洋夥伴關係全面進步協議。^[9]在其中六方（澳大利亞、加拿大、日本、墨西哥、新西蘭和新加坡）批准後，該協議於2018年12月30日對該六方生效。

最初的TPP包含降低非關稅壁壘和關稅貿易壁壘，^[10]並建立投资者—国家争端解决（ISDS）機制。^[11]

美国国际贸易委员会^[12]、彼得森国际经济研究所、世界银行和加拿大全球事務部首席經濟學家辦公室發現，最終協議如果獲得批准，將為所有簽署方帶來淨積極的經濟成果。^{[Note 1]}許多觀察家表示，該貿易協議將服務於地緣政治目的，即減少簽署方對中國大陸貿易的依賴，並拉近簽署方與美國的距離。^{[21][22][23][24]}

會籍

 

  參與

  簽署

  撤回

2016年2月4日四個締約方和另外八方，所有12方都簽署了TPP。^[25]

如果該協議在兩年內談妥，則該協議在所有簽署方批准後生效。如果該協議在2018年2月4日之前沒有得到所有簽署方批准，TPP將在至少6個簽署方批准後生效，這些簽署方GDP合計超過所有簽署方GDP的85%。

美國於2017年1月退出TPP，實際上結束了TPP生效的任何前景。作為回應，其餘各方談了新版本的協議CPTPP，該協議於2018年12月生效。

經濟體	TPSEP	參與TPP	簽署TPP	批准TPP
新加坡	2006年5月28日	000000002008-02-01-00002008年2月	000000002016-02-04-00002016年2月4日	不適用
汶萊	2006年5月28日	000000002008-02-01-00002008年2月	000000002016-02-04-00002016年2月4日	不適用
紐西蘭	2006年7月12日	000000002008-02-01-00002008年2月	000000002016-02-04-00002016年2月4日	000000002017-05-11-00002017年5月11日
智利	2006年11月8日	000000002008-02-01-00002008年2月	000000002016-02-04-00002016年2月4日	不適用
澳洲	未參與	000000002008-11-01-00002008年11月	000000002016-02-04-00002016年2月4日	不適用
秘魯	未參與	000000002008-11-01-00002008年11月	000000002016-02-04-00002016年2月4日	不適用
越南	未參與	000000002008-11-01-00002008年11月	000000002016-02-04-00002016年2月4日	不適用
馬來西亞	未參與	000000002010-10-01-00002010年10月	000000002016-02-04-00002016年2月4日	不適用
墨西哥	未參與	000000002012-10-01-00002012年10月	000000002016-02-04-00002016年2月4日	不適用
加拿大^[26]	未參與	000000002012-10-01-00002012年10月	000000002016-02-04-00002016年2月4日	不適用
日本	未參與	000000002013-05-01-00002013年5月	000000002016-02-04-00002016年2月4日	000000002017-01-20-00002017年1月20日

退出

2017年1月23日，美國總統特朗普簽署總統備忘錄退出TPP，使其在2016年2月前獲批准變得幾乎不可能。^[27]

經濟體	TPSEP	參與TPP	簽署TPP	撤銷日
美國	未參與	000000002008-02-01-00002008年2月	000000002016-02-04-00002016年2月4日	2017年1月23日^[28]

2018年4月13日，特朗普表示美國可能重新加入TPP。^{[29][30][31][32]}

潛在成員

APEC成員可以加入TPP，任何其他司法管轄區有現有TPP成員同意也可以加入。在收到加入申請後，條約締約方委員會將就加入條件進行談判。

韓國沒有參加2006年的協議，但對加入TPP表現出興趣^[33]。在2010年12月締結韓美自由貿易協定後被美國邀請參加TPP談判。^[34]韓國已與部分TPP成員達成雙邊貿易協定，但汽車製造和農業等領域仍需商定，進一步的多邊TPP談判有些複雜。^[35]

其他對加入TPP感興趣的，截至2010年包括台灣、^[36]菲律宾、^[37]和哥伦比亚^[38]，截至2012年包括泰国^[39]，截至2013年包括印度尼西亚、^[40]孟加拉、^[41]和印度^[42]

截至2013年，根據法學教授EdmundSim在2013年的說法，其中許多經濟體需要改變其保護主義的貿易政策才能加入TPP。^[43]

未參與談判的環太平洋地區最大經濟體是中國大陸。根據布鲁金斯学会2013年的報告，TPP對中國大陸的最根本挑戰是“它可能沒有足夠強大的吸引力來推動中國簽署這些新貿易投資標準。迄今為止，中國的反應是加快其在亞洲的貿易舉措。”^[44]2013年，人們認為中國大陸最終仍會有興趣加入TPP。^[45]學術分析表明，雖然TPP如果中國大陸參與會更成功，但給中國大陸帶來的好處是不易見形的。^[46]

2015年10月，印度尼西亚总统佐科·維多多宣布印尼有意加入TPP。^[47]

斯里蘭卡2016年宣布有興趣加入TPP，研究其可行性。^[48][49]

經濟體	TPSEP	TPP	宣布有興趣
哥倫比亞	未參與	宣布有興趣	000000002010-01-01-00002010年1月
菲律賓	未參與	宣布有興趣	000000002010-09-01-00002010年9月
泰國	未參與	宣布有興趣	000000002012-11-01-00002012年11月
台灣	未參與	宣布有興趣	000000002013-09-01-00002013年9月
南韓	未參與	宣布有興趣	000000002013-11-01-00002013年11月
印度尼西亞	未參與	宣布有加入意向^[47]	000000002015-10-01-00002015年10月
斯里蘭卡	未參與	宣布有興趣^[49]	000000002015-11-01-00002015年11月

歷史

跨太平洋戰略經濟夥伴關係協定

主条目：跨太平洋戰略經濟夥伴關係協定

文萊、智利、新加坡和新西蘭是跨太平洋戰略經濟夥伴關係協定（TPSEP）的締約方，該協定於2005年簽署，並於2006年生效。原TPSEP協定包含加入條款，並確認成員“承諾鼓勵其他經濟體加入本協定”。^[50][51]TPSEP是一項綜合性協議，涉及貨物貿易、原產地規則、貿易救濟、關於實施衛生和植物衛生措施、貿易技術壁壘、服務貿易、知識產權、政府採購和競爭政策。除其他外，它呼籲在2006年1月1日之前將成員之間的所有關稅削減90%，並在2015年之前將所有貿易關稅降至零。^[52]

儘管發起方和談判方都是APEC成員，但TPSEP並非APEC倡議。然而，TPP被認為是APEC倡議FTAAP的探路者。

原始談判

2008年1月，美國與P4成員就金融服務領域的貿易自由化展開談判。^[53]這導致了19輪正式談判和隨後的一系列額外會議，例如首席談判代表會議和部長會議，並促成了2015年10月5日宣布的協議。

批准原始協議

日本和新西蘭批准了最初的協議。

日本及其在該地區的主要競爭對手中國大陸對東南亞經濟應該如何發展持有兩極分化的看法。在TPP之前，日本曾嘗試通過在1997年9月提出亞洲貨幣基金來獲得主導地位，但在美國反對下未實現。到2011年，日本設法達成一項中日韓自由貿易協定，其中不包括美國。通過這種方式，日本打中國牌以便在美國支持下將TPP談判從中國大陸移到日本上。^[54]

日本批准TPP需要進行政治改革：將部分權力從農業部轉移到首相。^[55]

2016年12月9日，日本眾議院作出決議參與。日本於2017年1月20日通知TPP條約保存方新西蘭批准程序完成，日本成為第一個批准TPP的經濟體。^[56]

新西蘭於2017年5月11日批准TPP。^[57]新西蘭總理傑辛達·阿德恩（自2017年10月起上任）計劃在越南2017年11月及時允許新西蘭政府禁止外國投機者購買新西蘭現有房屋。她說：“我們的觀點是，通過放寬需求和禁止外國投機者購買現有房屋，同時實現我們的貿易目標，我們將有可能在確保我們提供負擔得起的住房的願望之間取得平衡。”^[58]

美國退出

 

關於美國退出跨太平洋夥伴關係談判和協議的總統備忘錄（2017年）

在2016年美國總統選舉演講中，共和黨提名人特朗普發誓如果當選要讓美國從TPP撤出。他認為，該協議將破壞美國經濟及其獨立性。^[59][60]2016年11月21日，特朗普在視頻信息中介紹了“將美國放在首位”的經濟戰略，稱他將談判“公平的雙邊貿易協議，將就業和工業帶回美國海岸”。作為該計劃的一部分，特朗普在上任的第一天就證實了他打算讓美國退出TPP。^[61][62][63]米奇·麥康諾申明，在特朗普就職前的國會跛腳鴨會議期間不會考慮TPP。^[64]

特朗普總統簽署總統備忘錄^{[Note 2]}後於2017年1月23日退出TPP。^[65]美國參議員約翰·席德尼·麥凱恩三世批評稱“這將發出一個令人不安的信號，表明美國在我們最負擔不起的時候退出亞太地區。”^[66]但美國參議員伯尼·桑德斯對退出表示讚賞，稱“在過去30年中，我們達成了一系列貿易協議[...]，這些協議使我們失去了數百萬體面的工作崗位，並引發了一場‘爭奪底部'，這降低了美國工人的工資。”^[67]

美國輿論

在2018年對一般對外貿易進行的一項研究中，研究人員發現，相當多美國人認為對外貿易有利於美國的增長，而非外國威脅。^[68]然而，在國際背景下，美國人通常是最不可能支持TPP的。美國公眾在支持貿易協議方面存在明顯的黨派分歧，那些自認為是民主黨成員或在政治上獨立的人比共和黨成員更有可能對其持積極態度。此外，與年長者相比，年輕人更有可能支持它。^[69]

特朗普總統表示反對將TPP作為其2016年選舉綱領的信條，提高了他的知名度^[70]。有批評者表示雖然特朗普一直在努力遏制中國大陸的經濟和地緣戰略影響，但退出TPP降低了旨在實現這一目標的條約的有效性^[71]。

自由貿易在美國一直是一個有政治爭議的問題。^[72]在2020年總統大選之後，聯邦政府的民選官員對TPP的熱情已經不高。^[73]

新談判和CPTPP

美國退出後，TPP前途未卜。然而，一些簽署方表示他們打算在沒有美國參與的情況下重新制定TPP。^[74]

2018年1月，美國之外的TPP其餘11方就修訂後的TPP達成一致，並更名CPTPP。CPTPP與TPP基本相同，只省略了在美國堅持下添加到TPP的20條條款。^[75]這些規定主要涉及投資、政府採購和知識產權^[76]。

內容

潛在成員於2015年11月5日發布了“受法律審查”的協議文本版本。^[77]完整協議的部分草案此前曾向公眾洩露。^[78]洩露文件中的許多條款都是以以前的貿易協定為藍本的。^{[來源請求]}

已隱藏部分未翻譯内容，歡迎參與翻譯。

The contents of the TPP go far beyond the standards drafted by the World Trade Organization. The TPP includes a negative-list of all sectors covered for the liberalizing trade, except for those clearly stated. The TPP includes new regulation for online commerce, treatment of foreign investors, far more comprehensive protection for intellectual property, labor codes, and an agreement for neutrality regarding state-owned enterprises.^[79]

A 2016 study by University of Maryland political scientists Todd Allee and Andrew Lugg finds that out of the 74 previous trade agreements that TPP members signed since 1995, the text of the TPP most resembles that from earlier U.S. trade agreements.^[80] A 2017 study found that the TPP scored high relative to other trade agreements in terms of a government's ability to freely legislate and implement regulations in given public policy domains.^[81]

貿易壁壘

The agreement cuts over 18,000 tariffs.^[82] Tariffs on all U.S. manufactured goods and almost all U.S. farm products would be eliminated completely, with most eliminations occurring immediately.^[83] According to the Congressional Research Service, TPP "would be the largest U.S. FTA by trade flows ($905 billion in U.S. goods and services exports and $980 billion in imports in 2014)".^[19] Including the US, the signatories represent roughly 40% of global GDP, and one-third of world trade.^[84]

In addition, the agreement mandates expedited customs procedures for express shipments and prohibits customs duties from being applied to electronic transmissions. It also requires additional privacy, security, and consumer protections for online transactions and encourages the publication of online customs forms. These provisions are expected to be particularly beneficial to small businesses.^[83]

環境保護

According to the Office of the United States Trade Representative, the "TPP includes the most robust enforceable environment commitments of any trade agreement in history".^[85] The USTR notes that the TPP requires signatories to fulfill their obligations under the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) to protect and conserve iconic species.^[85] According to the USTR, TPP is the first trade agreement to prohibit harmful fisheries subsidies, such as those that contribute to overfishing.^[85] The USTR asserts that TPP signatories are required to "combat illegal fishing", "promote sustainable fisheries management practices", and "protect wetlands and important natural areas", "combat wildlife trafficking, illegal logging, and illegal fishing" and "protect the marine environment from ship pollution, including by implementing their obligations under MARPOL (an international agreement to prevent marine pollution)".^[85]

Morin and Baumier of the Canada Research Chair in International Political Economy (writing for the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development) argue that while the TPP contains an impressive number of environmental provisions and a wide range of environmental protection areas, very few of these standards are innovative, most of which being copied from previous US agreements, and that the TPP missed an opportunity to be an original and progressive contribution to the environmental agenda. However, the TPP is innovative in its utilization of a combination of the American and the European approaches in environmental protection. Indeed, in doing so, the TPP became much more detailed and specific than regular US agreements while being legally more enforceable than European agreements.^[86]

In 2013 when TPP was still being negotiated, Sierra Club's director of responsible trade, Ilana Solomon, argued that the TPP "could directly threaten our climate and our environment [including] new rights that would be given to corporations, and new constraints on the fossil fuel industry all have a huge impact on our climate, water, and land."^[87] Upon the release of a draft of the Environment Chapter in January 2014, the Natural Resources Defense Council and the World Wide Fund for Nature joined with the Sierra Club in criticizing the TPP.^[88] After the announcement of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) on 25 September 2015 and the finalisation of the TPP a week later, critics discussed the interactions between the SDGs and the TPP. While one critic sees the TPP as providing a mixed bag of benefits and drawbacks to the SDGs,^[89] another regards the TPP as being incompatible with the SDGs, highlighting that if the development provisions clash with any other aspect of the TPP, the other aspect takes priority.^[90] The Friends of the Earth have spoken out against the TPP.^[91][92]

The White House has cited supportive statements from the World Wildlife Fund （页面存档备份，存于互联网档案馆）, the Nature Conservancy, the Humane Society, the Wildlife Conservation Society, Defenders of Wildlife, International Fund for Animal Welfare, World Animal Protection and other environmental groups in favor of the TPP.^[93][94] The Peterson Institute for International Economics argues that the TPP is "the most environmentally friendly trade deal ever negotiated."^[95] In regards to ISDS, PIIE analysts note that there is little evidence of constraints on environmental policies resulting from ISDS litigation.^[96]

A September 2016 report by the Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy (IATP) predicts that "as countries take action to protect the climate, conflicts between trade rules and climate goals will escalate".^[97]:1 The report goes on to say that trade agreements like the TPP set broad-reaching rules for the economy and government policy, thereby expanding trade, often in extractive sectors, and protecting corporations and financial firms from future measures to stabilize the climate.^[97]

治理

According to the Office of the United States Trade Representative, signatories are required to join the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC); criminalize bribery of public officials; have in place a code of conduct for public officials; take measures to decrease conflicts of interest; effectively enforce anti-corruption laws and regulations; and involve private organizations in the fight against corruption.^[98]

人權

According to the Office of the United States Trade Representative, the TPP prohibits exploitative child labor and forced labor; ensures the right to collective bargaining; and prohibits employment discrimination.^[99] The USTR asserts that "research by the International Labor Organization and the World Trade Organization finds that combining expanded trade opportunities with strong protections for workers can help workers move from informal-sector jobs into formal work in wage-paying, regulated export industries which offer a minimum wage, benefits, and safety programs".^[99] The USTR asserts that "research also shows that trade improves human rights conditions by fostering pluralistic institutions and increasing open exchanges of information."^[99]

PolitiFact rates President Obama's claim that due to the Trans-Pacific Partnership "we've got a country like Malaysia taking really serious efforts to crack down on human trafficking" as "mostly true".^[100] PolitiFact notes that Malaysia began to comply with the TPP in June 2015, amending its law to improve the treatment of trafficking victims.^[100] Among the changes, Malaysia gave victims better access to government shelters, transitional housing and more victim-friendly restitution procedures.^[100] Malaysia has also taken steps to stop human trafficking within the construction industry.^[100]

In August 2017, Reuters reported that the Vietnamese government was intensifying repression of human rights, in part because of the Trump administration's decision to drop the Trans-Pacific Partnership.^[101] Membership of the TPP had previously encouraged Vietnam to show a good human rights record.^[101]

知識產權

The intellectual property section of a leaked draft of the TPP lays out a minimum level of protection parties to the Agreement must grant for trademarks, copyright, and patents.^[102] Copyright is granted at a length of life of the author plus 70 years,^[102] and requires countries to set criminal penalties for violating copyright protections such as Digital Rights Management.^[103]

According to the Office of the United States Trade Representative, the TPP will spur innovation by requiring signatories to establish strong patentability standard and adopt strong copyright protections.^[104]

Walter Park, Professor of Economics at American University, argues, based on the existing literature, that the pharmaceutical protections in TPP will potentially enhance unaffiliated licensing in developing countries, lead to tech transfers that contribute to local learning-by-doing, stimulate new drug launches in more countries, expand marketing and distribution networks, and encourage early-stage pharmaceutical innovations.^[105]

As of December 2011, some provisions relating to the enforcement of patents and copyrights alleged to be present in the US proposal for the agreement had been criticised as being excessively restrictive, beyond those in the Korea–US trade agreement and Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA).^[106][107]

The Electronic Frontier Foundation^[107] was highly critical of the leaked draft chapter on intellectual property covering copyright, trademarks, and patents. In the US, they believed this was likely to further entrench controversial aspects of US copyright law (such as the Digital Millennium Copyright Act) and restrict the ability of Congress to engage in domestic law reform to meet the evolving intellectual property needs of American citizens and the innovative technology sector. Standardization of copyright provisions by other signatories would also require significant changes to other countries' copyright laws. These, according to EFF, include obligations for countries to expand copyright terms, restrict fair use, adopt criminal sanctions for copyright infringement that is done without a commercial motivation (ex. file sharing of copyrighted digital media), place greater liability on internet intermediaries, escalate protections for digital locks and create new threats for journalists and whistleblowers.^[107]

Both the copyright term expansion and the non-complaint provision (i.e., competent authorities may initiate legal action without the need for a formal complaint) previously failed to pass in Japan because they were so controversial.^[108] In early 2015, "a group of artists, archivists, academics, and activists ... in Japan [asked] their negotiators to oppose requirements in the TPP that would require their country, and five of the other 11 nations negotiating this secretive agreement, to expand their copyright terms to match the United States' already excessive length of copyright."^[108] The final agreement nonetheless sets a term of copyright equal to the one that obtains under U.S. law—life of the author plus 70 years.

Ken Akamatsu, creator of Japanese manga series Love Hina and Mahou Sensei Negima!, expressed concern the agreement could decimate the derivative dōjinshi (self-published) works prevalent in Japan. Akamatsu argued that the TPP "would destroy derivative dōjinshi. And as a result, the power of the entire manga industry would also diminish."^[109]

藥品

In May 2015, Nobel Memorial prize winning economist Paul Krugman expressed concern that the TPP would tighten the patent laws and allow corporations such as big pharmaceutical companies and Hollywood to gain advantages, in terms of increasing rewards, at the cost of consumers, and that people in developing countries would not be able to access the medicines under the TPP regime.^[110] However, Walter Park, Professor of Economics at American University, argues that it is far from clear in economic research that this would necessarily happen: clarifying intellectual property rights on drugs, for some developing countries, has not led to greater prices and less access to drugs.^[105] Park also argues, based on the existing literature, that the pharmaceutical protections in TPP will potentially enhance unaffiliated licensing in developing countries, lead to tech transfers that contribute to local learning-by-doing, stimulate new drug launches in more countries, expand marketing and distribution networks, and encourage early stage pharmaceutical innovations.^[105] The Office of the United States Trade Representative notes that the TPP "aligns with the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health", which allows developing countries to circumvent patent rights for better access to essential medicines.^[104]

Pharmaceutical companies have criticized TPP for having too lenient intellectual property protections.^{[105][111][112][113]}

In July 2015, an editorial in the New England Journal of Medicine cited concerns by Médecins sans Frontières and Oxfam that a spike in drug prices caused by patent extensions could threaten millions of lives.^[114] Extending "data exclusivity" provisions would "prevent drug regulatory agencies such as the Food and Drug Administration from registering a generic version of a drug for a certain number of years." The article arugues that TPP could theoretically require corporations be paid compensation for any "lost profits" found to result from a nation's health regulations.^[114] The article argues that the provisions in the TPP concerning generic drugs directly target India's pharmaceutical industry.^[114] Doctors Without Borders said in November 2015 that it was "extremely concerned about the inclusion of dangerous provisions that would dismantle public health safeguards enshrined in international law and restrict access to price-lowering generic medicines for millions of people."^[115][116] The Australian Public Health Association (PHAA) published a media release in February 2014 that highlighted "the ways in which some of the expected economic gains from the TPPA may be undermined by poor health outcomes, and the economic costs associated with these poor health outcomes."^[117]

A number of United States Congressional members,^[118] including Senator Bernie Sanders^[119] and Representatives Sander M. Levin, John Conyers, Jim McDermott and the now-retired Henry Waxman, as well as^[120] John Lewis, Charles B. Rangel, Earl Blumenauer, Lloyd Doggett and then-congressman Pete Stark,^[121] have expressed concerns about access to medicine. By protecting intellectual property in the form of the TPP mandating patent extensions, access by patients to affordable medicine in the developing world could be hindered, particularly in Vietnam.^[118] Additionally, they worried that the TPP would not be flexible enough to accommodate existing non-discriminatory drug reimbursement programs and the diverse health systems of member countries.^[121] In February 2015, former U.S. Labor Secretary Robert Reich stated he opposed the TPP because it would delay cheaper generic versions of drugs and because of its provisions for international tribunals that can require corporations be paid "compensation for any lost profits found to result from a nation's regulations."^[122]

投資者-國家仲裁

The TPP agreement establishes an investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanism,^[123] which grants investors the right to sue foreign governments for treaty violations. For example, if an investor invests in country "A", a member of a trade treaty, and country A breaches that treaty, then the investor may sue country A's government for the breach.^[124] ISDS is meant to provide investors in foreign countries basic protections from foreign government actions such as "freedom from discrimination", "protection against uncompensated expropriation of property", "protection against denial of justice" and "right to transfer capital":^[125][126]

• Freedom from discrimination: An assurance that those doing business abroad will face a level playing field and will not be treated less favorably than local investors or competitors from other countries.
• Protection against uncompensated seizure of property: An assurance that property of investors won't be seized by the government without just compensation.
• Protection against denial of justice: An assurance that investors will not be denied justice in criminal, civil, or administrative adjudicatory proceedings.
• Right to transfer capital: An assurance that investors will be able to move capital relating to their investments freely, subject to safeguards to provide government flexibility, including to respond to financial crises and ensure the integrity and stability of the financial system.

ISDS cannot ask governments to overturn local laws (unlike the World Trade Organization) which violate trade agreements,^[96][127] but can grant monetary damages to investors adversely affected by such laws.^[128] As pointed out by the Office of the United States Trade Representative, ISDS requires specific treaty violations, and does not allow corporations to sue solely over "lost profits".^[126]

The TPP specifically excludes tobacco industries from the ISDS process.^[129] The carve-out came as a response to concerns about ISDS cases against anti-smoking laws, including Philip Morris v. Uruguay.^[130] The exemption of tobacco from ISDS is a first for an international trade agreement.^[129]

On the basis of leaks, economists Joseph Stiglitz and Adam S. Hersh criticized the ISDS provisions of the TPP for interfering with the ability of governments to prevent public harm, alleging that if asbestos been discovered today, governments would have been unable to impose regulations without creating grounds for an ISDS suit.^[131] Stiglitz also claimed that the TPP would give oil companies the right to sue governments for efforts to reduce carbon emissions and global warming.^[132]

In November 2015, Columbia professor Jeffrey Sachs concluded that the ISDS system of the TPP grants huge power to investors, and damages the judicial systems of all the member countries. He alleges that ISDS has been already used by corporations to upset governments so as to weaken the regulations that have negative effects on their profits.^[133] In February 2016, Lise Johnson and Lisa Sachs of the Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment and Jeffrey Sachs of the Earth Institute allege that foreign corporations can sue a national government in international arbitration over a government's actions if the measures (including those for public health, national security, environment, food and drug, and responses to economic crises) have a negative effect on their profits and economic interests.^[134] Lori Wallach of Public Citizen's Global Trade Watch raised similar concerns while TPP was being negotiated.^[135]

In a February 2016 op-ed against the TPP, Senator Elizabeth Warren used the example of a French company suing Egypt because Egypt raised its minimum wage as an argument against the ISDS provisions of the TPP.^[136] The Washington Post's editorial board has, however, challenged this characterization of the case, noting that "Veolia of France, a waste management company, invoked ISDS to enforce a contract with the government of Alexandria, Egypt, that it says required compensation if costs increased; the company maintains that the wage increases triggered this provision. Incidentally, Veolia was working with Alexandria on a World Bank-supported project to reduce greenhouse gases, not some corporate plot to exploit the people. The case — which would result, at most, in a monetary award to Veolia, not the overthrow of the minimum wage — remains in litigation."^[137]

The Office of the United States Trade Representative challenges the notion that ISDS challenges "the sovereign ability of governments impose any measure they wish to protect labor rights, the environment, or other issues of public welfare".^[126] The International Bar Association (IBA) mirrors these sentiments, noting that "while investment treaties limit states’ ability to inflict arbitrary or discriminatory treatment, they do not limit (and, in fact, expressly safeguard) a state's sovereign right to regulate in the public interest in a fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory manner."^[127] The White House notes that investment protections are a component of more than 3,000 trade agreements, the vast majority of which have some form of neutral arbitration.^[138] The United States is party to at least 50 such agreements, has only faced 13 ISDS cases and never lost an ISDS case.^[138] The White House asserts that the ISDS components of the TPP are an upgrade and improvement on ISDS in other trade agreements: TPP makes it absolutely clear that governments can regulate in the public interest (including with regard to health, safety and the environment); TPP includes the ability to dismiss frivolous claims quickly and award fees against the claimant to deter such suits; sham corporations will be prevented from accessing the investment protections; and arbitration proceedings under TPP will be open to the public and allow for inputs from non-parties.^[138]

The Peterson Institute for International Economics argues that "the ISDS provisions in the TPP are a significant improvement over those in previous agreements".^[96] PIIE notes that the ISDS mechanism in the TPP respects environmental, health, and safety regulation; ensures the transparency of dispute proceedings; and eliminates forum shopping.^[96] PIIE asserts that some of the innovations in the ISDS provisions of TPP "are generally disliked by the US business community."^[96] PIIE claims that ISDS provisions are necessary, as they boost investment: "empirical evidence has shown that treaties including these provisions have a positive effect on foreign direct investment (FDI) flows between signatory countries."^[139] PIIE challenges the claim that ISDS "arbitrators lack integrity", noting that arbitrators take an oath of impartiality and both sides of a case choose arbitrators.^[96] PIIE agrees "that secrecy has gone too far" in many ISDS cases, but notes that "TPP negotiators heeded this criticism" and opened up ISDS cases to greater transparency.^[96]

According to the International Bar Association (IBA), states have won a higher percentage of ISDS cases than investors, and that around one-third of all cases end in settlement.^[127] Claimant investors, when successful, recover on average less than half of the amounts claimed.^[127] IBA notes that "only 8 per cent of ISDS proceedings are commenced by very large multinational corporations."^[127] IBA challenges the notion that ISDS is biased against developing countries, noting that there is "no correlation between the success rates of claims against states and their income levels or development status."^[127] IBA notes that ISDS is necessary even in countries with sophisticated domestic legal systems because those domestic courts rule according to domestic laws, not international law.^[127] IBA notes that "increasingly, awards require the losing party to pay arbitration costs and legal fees to the winning party", which deters investors from initiating unmeritorious cases.^[127]

勞工標準

According to the Office of the United States Trade Representative, the TPP imposes "binding and fully enforceable obligations" on signatories to "protect the freedom to form unions and bargain collectively" and "eliminate exploitative child labor and forced labor protect against employment discrimination".^[140] The obligations include "laws on acceptable conditions of work related to minimum wages, hours of work, and occupational safety and health."^[140] The USTR insists that if countries like Malaysia and Vietnam do not enforce provisions relating to forced labor, human trafficking and collective bargaining, they will cease to get the economic benefits of the TPP agreement.^[141]

The Peterson Institute for International Economics asserts that "the TPP includes more protections of labor rights than any previous US free trade agreement."^[142] In January 2016, Human Rights Watch said that the TPP side agreements with Vietnam, Malaysia, and Brunei "are a unique and significant step in efforts to protect labor rights in trade agreements" but noted that enforcement of these rules remains to be seen: "gauging compliance will require subjective assessments by the US that may take years to carry out and face obstacles arising from foreign policy objectives, commercial interests, and other political considerations."^[143]

Dartmouth economics Professor Emily J. Blanchard argues that while the TPP has been roundly criticized on the political left, progressives should actually be supportive of the TPP: "The TPP’s promise of a new progressive rule book – one that includes enforceable agreements against child labor and workplace discrimination, measures to punish illegal logging and trade in protected species, and protections against consumer fraud – would mark a substantial step forward in the progressive policy agenda on the global stage."^[144]

In May 2015, U.S. congressman Sander Levin argued that it is difficult to enforce trade deals, as he questioned Vietnam's willingness to meet the labour standards of TPP.^[145] A report by U.S. Senator Elizabeth Warren said that there was a huge gap between the labor standards of past US free trade agreements and the actual enforcement of those provisions.^[145] However, PIIE analysts note that research shows that the presence of "sticks" (a possible suspension of trade benefits) and "carrots" (technical assistance) in trade deals increase the likelihood that labor obligations in trade deals have a positive effect; there are both sticks and carrots present in TPP.^[146]

監管合作

Even though the TPP had not been passed, the agreement had already introduced forms of regulatory cooperation for agriculture beyond that found in the WTO.^[147] This means that regulators in different TPP signatories have been engaging with each other and building trust.^[147] Chad P. Bown, senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, argues that this regulatory cooperation meant that the US poultry industry was not as hard-hit by the 2015 bird flu outbreak, as regulators in TPP countries cooperated and continued to accept US exports of poultry.^[147]

經濟影響

美國國際貿易委員會、彼得森國際經濟研究所、世界銀行和加拿大全球事務部首席經濟學家辦公室發現，最終協議如果獲得批准，將帶來淨積極結果。^{[148][12][149]}

歐盟

歐盟試圖與每個加入TPP的經濟體達成貿易協定：自2013年以來，歐盟和日本之間一直在就自由貿易協定進行談判，2015年歐盟提出了改善南美貿易的新戰略亞太地區題為“全民貿易”。^[150]

中國大陸

2020年11月，中國大陸與14個亞太國家簽署了一項貿易協議，即區域全面經濟夥伴關係協定。^[151]

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According to a 2020 study, the TPP pushed China to introduce its own internal liberal market reforms. Reform-minded elites in China used the TPP to justify reform.^[152] In anticipation of China's exclusion from the agreement, exposed Chinese firms began investing in production in TPP member states.^[153]

經濟平等

In 2013, Nobel Memorial prize-winning economist Joseph Stiglitz warned that, based on leaked drafts of the TPP, it "serves the interests of the wealthiest."^[154][155] Organised labour in the U.S. argued, during the negotiations, that the trade deal would largely benefit corporations at the expense of workers in the manufacturing and service industries.^[156] The Economic Policy Institute and the Center for Economic and Policy Research have argued that the TPP could result in job losses and declining wages.^[157][158]

Economists Peter A. Petri and Michael G. Plummer challenge the view that TPP will primarily benefit the wealthy. Their analysis finds that "the gains from TPP appear to be fairly distributed—labour will gain relative to capital, and cost reductions will favour low-income households. Some workers will need to change jobs, but they constitute a small fraction of normal job churn in any given year, and the national benefits argue for generous compensation for their adjustment costs. The agreement will also benefit workers in TPP's poorest member countries."^[159] Research by Harvard economist Robert Z. Lawrence finds that the "percentage gains for labor income from the TPP will be slightly greater than the gains to capital income. Households in all quintiles will benefit by similar percentages, but once differences in spending shares are taken into account, the percentage gains to poor and middle-class households will be slightly larger than the gains to households at the top."^[160][161] An opinion piece by Ed Gerwin in The Wall Street Journal argues that the TPP agreement benefits small businesses in the US.^[83]

Economists David Autor, David Dorn and Gordon H. Hanson, who have extensively studied US labor markets adjustments to trade competition shocks caused by China,^[162] support TPP.^[163] They argue that TPP "would promote trade in knowledge-intensive services in which U.S. companies exert a strong comparative advantage", note that "killing the TPP would do little to bring factory work back to America" and argue that it would pressure China to raise regulatory rules and standards to those of TPP members.^[163]

According to the U.S. International Trade Commission, the TPP will have positive effects on the U.S. economy as a whole, with unskilled labor reaping 25% of the gains, skilled workers 41% and business owners 34%.^[164]

宏觀經濟學

世界銀行報告

世界銀行發現，如果簽署方批准，TPP協議到2030年可使其成員GDP平均提高1.1%。還可以在2030年前將成員貿易增加11%，代表一個提振區域貿易增長從1990-07年的10%放緩至2010-14年的平均5%。^[148]世界銀行發現，該協議將提高所有簽署方的實際工資：“例如，在美國，預計實際工資的變化很小，因為到2030年，非熟練和熟練的工資將分別增長0.4%和0.6%。相比之下，在越南，隨著非熟練勞動力（例如紡織品）的生產密集型轉移到越南，到2030年，TPP可以將非熟練工人的實際工資提高14%以上。”^[148]

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美國國際貿易委員會估計

The U.S. International Trade Commission estimates that "TPP would have positive effects, albeit small as a percentage of the overall size of the U.S. economy".^[12] There will be 128,000 more full-time jobs.^[164] By 2032, U.S. annual real income would increase by 0.23%, real GDP would be $42.7 billion or 0.15% higher, employment would be 0.07% higher, US exports would increase 1%, and imports would increase 1.1%.^[12] The report added, "TPP would generally establish trade-related disciplines that strengthen and harmonize regulations, increase certainty, and decrease trade costs for firms that trade and invest in the TPP region."^[12] Vietnam is often seen as the biggest beneficiary of TPP.^{[165][166][21]} The U.S. International Trade Commission identifies the following US industries as net beneficiaries of TPP: Passenger cars; Apparel, Dairy production; Retailers and Wholesalers; and Business services; and as net losers: Auto parts; Textiles; Soybean production; Transportation and tourism; and Chemicals and drugs.^[12][167]

加拿大全球事務部首席經濟學家辦公室報告

According to a report by the Office of the Chief Economist at Global Affairs Canada, ratification of TPP would increase Canada's GDP by $4.3 billion by 2040.^[15][168] This is primarily due to the preferential access it would receive to markets in the Asia-Pacific rim.^[15][168] According to the report, ratification by the other TPP signatories but a failure by Canada to ratify the agreement would lead Canada to face estimated GDP losses of $5.3 billion by 2040.^[15][168]

Peterson Institute for International Economics report

Economists Peter A. Petri and Michael G. Plummer of the Peterson Institute for International Economics project that the TPP would increase incomes in the U.S. by $131 billion annually, or 0.5 percent of GDP. Exports from the U.S. would increase by $357 billion annually, or 9.1 percent, as a result of the agreement.^[149] However, two Tufts University economists argue that the research by Petri relies on unrealistic assumptions such as full employment: lost jobs will be immediately replaced in other industrial sectors.^[169] According to Harvard economist Dani Rodrik, "Petri and Plummer assume that labor markets are sufficiently flexible that job losses in adversely affected parts of the economy are necessarily offset by job gains elsewhere. Unemployment is ruled out from the start – a built-in outcome of the model that TPP proponents often fudge."^[16] Rodrik notes that "the Petri-Plummer model is squarely rooted in decades of academic trade modeling, which makes a sharp distinction between microeconomic effects (shaping resource allocation across sectors) and macroeconomic effects (related to overall levels of demand and employment). In this tradition, trade liberalization is a microeconomic "shock" that affects the composition of employment, but not its overall level."^[16]

塔夫茨大學報告

Tufts University researchers project the TPP would have a negative impact on employment: 450,000 US jobs, 75,000 Japanese jobs, 58,000 Canadian jobs and 5,000 New Zealand jobs would be lost by 2025.^[169] According to the report, 771,000 jobs would be lost in total and positive economic effects would be negligible for participating countries.^[169][170]

Harvard economist Robert Z. Lawrence says that the model used by the Tufts researchers "is simply not suited for credibly predicting the effects of the TPP" and argues that the model used by Petri and Plummer is superior.^[17] Lawrence argues that the model used by the Tufts researchers "does not have the granularity that allows it to estimate variables such as exports, imports, foreign direct investment, and changes in industrial structure. As a result, its predictions ignore the benefits to the TPP economies that occur through increased specialization, the realization of scale economies, and improved consumer choice."^[17] Lawrence also notes that the model used by the Tufts researchers finds that the TPP will cause GDP to fall by 5.24% in non-TPP developing countries, such as China, India, and Indonesia, which Lawrence is highly skeptical of: "It is not believable that a trade agreement of this magnitude could cause the rest of the world to plummet into recession."^[17] Harvard economist Dani Rodrik, a well-known skeptic of globalization, says that the Tufts researchers do "a poor job of explaining how their model works, and the particulars of their simulation are somewhat murky... the Capaldo framework lacks sectoral and country detail; its behavioral assumptions remain opaque; and its extreme Keynesian assumptions sit uneasily with its medium-term perspective."^[16]

Fredrik Erixon and Matthias Bauer of the European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE) write that the Tufts analysis has such serious flaws "that its results should neither be regarded reliable nor realistic."^[18] They write that Tufts model is "by and large a demand-driven model that does not make efforts to capture the supply-side effects of trade, which are the effects that are proven to be the core positive effects of trade liberalisation. Equally problematic, the model is not designed to assess the effect on trade from trade agreements – in fact, the model is profoundly ill suited for such an exercise. No trade economist, regardless what school of thought he or she comes from, has ever used this model to make estimates of trade. The reason is simple: if a model cannot predict the effects on the flows and profile of trade as a consequence of trade liberalisation, it is of no use at all."^[18] They add, "In Capaldo’s analysis, structural change and the emergence of new industries do not play a role at all. Capaldo implicitly assumes that an economy with its labour and capital does not respond and adjust to new circumstances. New competition only leads to new unemployment. In addition, the impact of lower barriers on international commerce on product and process innovation is neglected. Finally, Capaldo does not account for the impact of competition on the cost of production and final consumer prices."^[18]

According to the Congressional Research Service, "The Tufts study has drawn particular criticism as an unconventional framework for analyzing trade agreements, whereas Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models, such as that used in the Peterson study are standard in trade policy analysis."^[19] Fabio Ghironi, Professor in Economics at the University of Washington, describes the models used by the World Bank and the Peterson Institute in more favorable terms than the Tufts analysis.^[20]

自由化

According to an analysis by the Cato Institute of the chapters of the TPP, 15 chapters have a liberalizing impact, 5 have a protectionist impact, and 2 have a neutral impact.^[171] Considered as a whole, the terms of the TPP are net liberalizing.^[171]

There have been conflicting arguments on whether or not the TPP aims to increase the liberalization of trade. For arguments that propose that the TPP succeeds at liberalizing trade among the participating nations, there is a question of whether or not this causes a positive or a negative net change. Some scholars argue that participatory members of the TPP believe that such membership is a utilitarian and practical method toward new trade liberalization.^[172] Scholars Peter Petri and Michael Plummer describe the TPP as a "dynamic process - and example of competitive liberalization," and this liberalization described can result in a new type of governance for the Asia-Pacific, as well as transnational trade.^[173]

According to analyst and economist B.R. Williams, the United States has a large role in the reduction of trade barriers and increased U.S. investment. Williams explains that the U.S. aims to create a "broader platform for trade liberalization, particularly throughout the Asia-Pacific region."^[174] Scholars C. Li and J. Whalley explore a numerical approach in explaining the liberalizing effects of the TPP. Li and Whalley uses a quantitative equilibrium simulation to explore the effects of the TPP on the liberalization of trade and new markets.^[175]

地緣政治

TPP將增加日本進行經濟改革以重振經濟的可能性，再加上韓國可能加入TPP，可能會對中國大陸產生經濟影響。通過降低中國大陸經濟競爭力、降低北京領導層制定東亞和東南亞貿易規則的可能性，北京將承受巨大的內部和外部壓力來實現經濟自由化。^[22]日本前首相安倍晉三認為，未來中國大陸加入TPP將對亞太地區產生重大的安撫影響。^[23]

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U.S. Trade Representative Michael Froman said that a failure to ratify the TPP would give China the opportunity to boost its exports and set labor and environmental standards in the fast-growing Asia Pacific region through the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).^[176]

South Korea did not participate in the TPP "largely out of a concern to maintain balance in its economic relations with China and the United States" but showed greater interest in joining after Japan, its biggest economic competitor, decided to participate.^[21] The Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, and Taiwan also reportedly considered and implemented various domestic reforms to improve their prospects for eventually joining.^[177]

Since formal TPP negotiations began in 2010, China's attitude towards TPP has:

swung from disdain to suspicion to cautious embrace... Conclusion of a TPP agreement in early October has sparked a lively debate in Beijing, with the weight of elite opinion seeming to tilt toward eventual membership; for example, the head of the Chinese-sponsored Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), Jin Liqun, announced his support during a speech in Washington shortly after the TPP deal was announced.^[21]

The TPP may give renewed impetus to trade negotiations among China, Japan, and Korea, and increase the likelihood of Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) which could provide a possible pathway to a free trade area of the Asia-Pacific.^[21]

In January 2016, the National Association of Manufacturers announced its support for TPP, saying "without such an agreement, the United States would be ceding economic leadership to other global powers, letting them set the rules of economic engagement in the region".^[178]

A 2016 study by University of Maryland political scientists Todd Allee and Andrew Lugg suggested that if the TPP became standard legal text, it would shape future trade cooperation and agreements.^[80]

An October 2016 survey of international relations scholars showed that the overwhelming majority supported the TPP.^[179]

美國考量

The original TPP was thought by some to likely bring China's neighbours closer to the United States and reduce their dependence on Chinese trade.^{[165][166][21][22][23][180][181][24][182][183]} If ratified, the TPP would have strengthened American influence on future rules for the global economy. US Secretary of Defense Ash Carter claimed the passage of the TPP to be as valuable to the United States as the creation of another aircraft carrier.^[21] President Obama has argued "if we don't pass this agreement—if America doesn't write those rules—then countries like China will".^[184] According to the Congressional Research Service, "many Asian policymakers—correctly or not—could interpret a failure of TPP in the United States as a symbol of declining U.S. interest in the region and inability to assert leadership... failure to conclude TPP could, in effect, allow China to shape regional rules of commerce and diplomacy through its own trade and investment initiatives, potentially creating regional rules and norms less beneficial for U.S. interests."^[19] Michael J. Green and Matthew P. Goodman argue that "history will be unforgiving if TPP fails... If Congress rejects TPP, trying to negotiate a similar arrangement in Asia would reopen demands on the United States—and in the meantime, would likely give impetus to alternative arrangements like RCEP that exclude the United States. Momentum behind the U.S.-led international order would shift to momentum against it. Future generations of historians will take note of U.S. leadership at this moment."^[21] Dan Ikenson, director of Cato's Herbert A. Stiefel Center for Trade Policy Studies, argued in July 2016 that the "failure of Congress to ratify the Trans-Pacific Partnership this year would do more to subvert U.S. regional and global interests than anything China is capable of doing."^[177] Stephen M. Walt, professor of international relations at Harvard University, writing after the Trump Administration abandoned the TPP, described the TPP as "a key institution that would have bound a number of Asian countries more tightly to the United States".^[182]

來自TPP簽署方之外的意見

On 30 January 2015 Philip Hammond, the former Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom, described the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership as "potentially important liberalising steps forward".^[185]

The European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE), a think tank on European policies, predicted in 2012 that the TPP would be a "deadly threat to European exporters of agricultural products in TPP countries".^[186]

ECIPE has said in 2014 that TPP "will be the first 'competing' economic integration that is large enough to have a considerable negative impact on Europe. In the long-term, the negative effects will come from dynamic impact, e.g. on investment, productivity and competitiveness".^[187]Pascal Lamy called the TPP "the last of big old-style trade agreements".^[187]:2

Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev was reportedly critical of the TPP, saying that "the WTO is being encroached upon" and this might lead to the "destruction of world trade".^{[來源請求]}

批評

已隱藏部分未翻譯内容，歡迎參與翻譯。

维基共享资源中相关的多媒体资源：跨太平洋夥伴關係協議

维基共享资源中相关的多媒体资源：跨太平洋夥伴關係協議

In 2014, Nobel Memorial Prize-winning economist Paul Krugman said "there isn't a compelling case for this deal, from either a global or a national point of view."^[188]

In February 2016, United Nations' human rights expert Alfred de Zayas argued that the TPP was fundamentally flawed and was based on an outdated model of trade pacts, and that governments should not sign or ratify the TPP.^[189] According to de Zayas, the international human rights regime imposes binding legal obligations on countries, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and trade must be done under the human rights regime. Under the ISDS in the TPP, investors can sue a government, while a government cannot sue investors. De Zayas argued that this asymmetry made the system unfair. He added that international law, including accountability and transparency, must prevail over trade pacts.

貨幣操縱

Some critics and even supporters of the TPP wanted the deal to contain measures that would crack down on nations who engage in alleged currency manipulation, notably China.^[190] However, Daniel Drezner, professor of international politics at Tufts University, has argued that the trade deal was never likely to include restrictions on currency manipulation, as it would have restricted U.S. monetary policy.^[191] Harvard economist Jeffrey Frankel has argued that the inclusion of currency manipulation language in TPP would be a mistake.^[192] Frankel noted that currency manipulation would be hard to enforce (in part because it is impossible to tell whether a currency is overvalued or undervalued); "currency manipulation" can often be legitimate; China, often alleged to be a major currency manipulator, is not party to the TPP; currency manipulation accusations are often meritless; and because it would restrict U.S. monetary policy.^[192]

協議文本冗長復雜

Donald Trump has criticized the TPP agreement for being too long and complicated, saying "[i]t's 5,600 pages long, so complex that nobody's read it."^[193] Senator Bernie Sanders has charged that the "TPP is much more than a 'free trade' agreement."^[194]

However, Georgetown University Professor Marc L. Busch and McGill University Professor Krzysztof J. Pelc note that modern trade deals are long and complex because they often tackle non-tariff barriers to trade, such as different standards and regulations, in addition to tariffs. Due to steadily decreasing tariff barriers since WWII, countries have become increasingly likely to enact trade barriers in the form of non-tariff barriers. National firms often lobby their own governments to enact regulations that are designed to keep out foreign firms. The TPP addresses many of these "disguised restrictions on trade" by, for instance, "basing these measures on agreed-upon science; making the process of formulating regulations more transparent; and giving foreign exporters opportunities to offer substantive input in the formulation of these measures."^[195]

談判保密

As with many trade agreements^{[來源請求]}, until being finalized, negotiations for the TPP were conducted with significant secrecy. Drafts of the agreement were kept classified during negotiations, and access to the working text was significantly restricted even for government officials and business representatives involved in the talks.^[196] Despite this, some sections of TPP drafts were leaked to the public by WikiLeaks, which published an intellectual property chapter draft in 2013,^[197][198] an environmental chapter draft in 2014,^[199] and the final intellectual property chapter in 2014.^[200]

In 2012, critics such as Public Citizen's Global Trade Watch, a consumer advocacy group, called for more open negotiations in regard to the agreement. U.S. Trade Representative Ron Kirk responded that he believes the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) conducted "the most engaged and transparent process as we possibly could", but that "some measure of discretion and confidentiality" are needed "to preserve negotiating strength and to encourage our partners to be willing to put issues on the table they may not otherwise."^[201] He dismissed the "tension" as natural and noted that when the Free Trade Area of the Americas drafts were released, negotiators were subsequently unable to reach a final agreement.^[201]

On 23 May 2012, U.S. Senator Ron Wyden, Democrat of Oregon, introduced S. 3225, which would have required the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative to disclose its TPP documents to all members of Congress.^[202] Had it passed, Wyden said that the bill would increase Congressional access to information about USTR activity.^[203]

Michael R. Wessel, former commissioner on the U.S. Trade Deficit Review Commission claimed in May 2015 that "cleared advisors" like himself were "prohibited from sharing publicly the criticisms we’ve lodged about specific proposals and approaches". He claimed that only portions of the text had been provided, "to be read under the watchful eye of a USTR official", that access on secure government-run website did not contain the most-up-to-date information, and that for cleared advisors to get that information, he had "to travel to certain government facilities and sign in to read the materials" and "even then, the administration determines what we can and cannot review and, often, they provide carefully edited summaries rather than the actual underlying text, which is critical to really understanding the consequences of the agreement."^[204]

In June 2015, U.S. Senator Rand Paul, Republican of Kentucky, opposed the bill to fast-track the congressional ratification of the TPP on the basis of the trade agreement's secrecy.^[205]

行業影響力

U.S. Senator Elizabeth Warren, Democrat of Massachusetts, has alleged that corporations and industry exert disproportionate influence on U.S. trade negotiators.^[206] She asserted in July 2016 that 85% of seats on U.S. trade advisory committees were held by "senior corporation executives or industry lobbyists", and that the members of the committees "whisper in the ear" of negotiators.^[206]

Michelle Ye Hee Lee, a fact-checker for The Washington Post, wrote that Warren used "misleading language" in describing the TPP. While Warren implied that "28 trade advisory committees were formed" specifically to influence the TPP, the advisory committees were actually created as part of the Trade Act of 1974; only the membership of the trade committees had changed during the Obama administration and the early phases of the TPP. Regarding Warren's claim that trade advisers secretly "whisper in the ear of our trade negotiators", Lee wrote: "while the direct meetings take place in private, committees still have to submit written reports to Congress and provide written recommendations and advice that are made public."^[206] Furthermore, Lee wrote, "it is true that industry representatives make up a large number of the total membership, but it is worth noting that there is a labor committee in the second tier, labor representatives in the first tier and that the industry groups have a narrow focus (to give technical advice)."^[206]

In response to criticisms about transparency and the large representation from industry representatives, USTR announced it would create a Public Interest Trade Advisory Committee.^[206]

競業禁止條款

Dean Baker argued that Article 18.78, under which countries should ensure that they protect trade secrets and impose criminal procedures for violators, could be used to enforce non-compete agreements.^[207] Baker points out that California's success can partly be attributed to the fact that the state did not allow for the enforcement of non-compete agreements, making it easy for tech workers to quit their jobs and start to work for another company.^[207]

政治家的批評

In 2014, linguist and political activist Noam Chomsky warned that the TPP is "designed to carry forward the neoliberal project to maximize profit and domination, and to set the working people in the world in competition with one another so as to lower wages to increase insecurity."^[208] Senator Bernie Sanders (I-VT) argues that trade agreements like the TPP "have ended up devastating working families and enriching large corporations."^[209] Professor and former Secretary of Labor Robert Reich contends that the TPP is a "Trojan horse in a global race to the bottom."^{[210][211][212]}

參見

已隱藏部分未翻譯内容，歡迎參與翻譯。

• Association of Southeast Asian Nations
  • Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP - ASEAN plus 6)
• Combating Online Infringement and Counterfeits Act (COICA)
• Counterfeit
• Digital rights
• Trade Promotional Authority
• Foreign trade of the United States
• Free trade
• Free trade area
• Generic drug
• Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF)
• Non-tariff barriers to trade
• Office of the United States Trade Representative
• Protect IP Act (PIPA)
• Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA)
• Sustainable Development Goals (SDG)
• Tariff
• Trade in Services Agreement (TISA)
• Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement
• United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA)

註

1. ^{[13][14][15][16][17][18][19][20]}
2. The official title of the document is: Presidential Memorandum Regarding Withdrawal of the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations and Agreement [1] （页面存档备份，存于互联网档案馆）

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