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维基百科

意志力薄弱

十月 20, 2023

意志力薄弱（希臘語 ἀκρασία/akrasia。有時音譯為 acrasia，英語中也作 acrasy 或 acracy）是一個古希臘哲學詞彙，指是缺乏自我控制，或違背自己的判斷力行事。

參考資料 编辑

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  • Audi, R. Weakness of Will and Practical Judgment. Noûs. May 1979, 13 (2): 173–196. JSTOR 2214396. doi:10.2307/2214396. 
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  • Campbell, P.G. Diagnosing Agency. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology. June 2000, 7 (2): 107–119. 
  • Chan, D.K. Non-Intentional Actions. American Philosophical Quarterly. April 1995, 32 (2): 139–151. 
  • Davidson, D. How is Weakness of the Will Possible?. Essays on Actions and Events . Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1980: 21–42 [Essay first published 1969]. ISBN 978-0-19-924626-7. 
  • Gilead, A. How is Akrasia Possible After All?. Ratio. September 1999, 12 (3): 257–270. doi:10.1111/1467-9329.00091. 
  • Haggard, P.; Cartledge, P.; Dafydd, M.; Oakley, D.A. Anomalous Control: When 'Free-Will' is not Conscious. Consciousness and Cognition. September 2004, 13 (3): 646–654. PMID 15336254. S2CID 5731662. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2004.06.001. 
  • Haji, I. Moral Responsibility and the Problem of Induced Pro-Attitudes. Dialogue. Fall 1996, 35 (4): 703–720. S2CID 170293939. doi:10.1017/S0012217300008581. 
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  • Hartmann, D. Neurophysiology and Freedom of the Will. Poiesis & Praxis. May 2004, 2 (4): 275–284. S2CID 207063367. doi:10.1007/s10202-003-0056-z. 
  • Harwood, Sterling. For an Amoral, Dispositional Account of Weakness of Will. Auslegung. 1992, 18 (1): 27–38.  reprinted in Harwood, Sterling (编). Business as Ethical and Business as Usual. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing. 1996: 378–384. 
  • Henry, D. Aristotle on Pleasure and the Worst Form of Akrasia, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 5 (3): 255–270. September 2002. 
  • Hodgson, D. Plain Person's Free Will. Journal of Consciousness Studies. January 2005, 12 (1): 3–19. 
  • Holton, R. Intention and Weakness of Will. The Journal of Philosophy. May 1999, 96 (5): 241–262. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.649.927  . JSTOR 2564667. doi:10.2307/2564667. 
  • Hookway, C. Epistemic Akrasia and Epistemic Virtue. Fairweather, A.; Zagzebski, L. (编). Virtue Epistemology: Essays on Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility . Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2001: 178–199. ISBN 978-0-19-514077-4. 
  • Jiang, X.-Y. What Kind of Knowledge Does a Weak-Willed Person Have? — A Comparative Study of Aristotle and the Ch'eng-Chu School. Philosophy East & West. April 2000, 50 (2): 242–253. 
  • Joyce, R. Early Stoicism and Akrasia. Phronesis. 1995, 40 (3): 315–335. doi:10.1163/156852895321051874. 
  • Martin, M.W. Alcoholism as Sickness and Wrongdoing. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour. June 1999, 29 (2): 109–131. doi:10.1111/1468-5914.00094. 
  • Mele, A.R. Akrasia, Self-Control, and Second-Order Desires. Noûs. September 1992, 26 (3): 281–302. JSTOR 2215955. doi:10.2307/2215955. 
  • Mele, A.R. Akratic Feelings. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. December 1989, 50 (2): 277–288. JSTOR 2107960. doi:10.2307/2107960. 
  • Mele, A.R. Incontinent Believing. Philosophical Quarterly. April 1986, 36 (143): 212–222. JSTOR 2219769. doi:10.2307/2219769. 
  • Mele, A.R. Is Akratic Action Unfree?. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. June 1986, 46 (4): 673–679. JSTOR 2107677. doi:10.2307/2107677. 
  • Mele, A.R. Real Self-Deception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences. March 1997, 20 (1): 91–102. PMID 10096996. S2CID 1701371. doi:10.1017/s0140525x97000034. 
  • Metcalfe, J.; Mischel, W. A Hot/Cool-System Analysis of Delay of Gratification: Dynamics of Willpower. Psychological Review. January 1999, 106 (1): 3–19. PMID 10197361. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.3. 
  • Owens, D. Epistemic Akrasia. The Monist. July 2002, 85 (3): 381–397. doi:10.5840/monist200285316. 
  • Peijnenburg, J. Akrasia, Dispositions and Degrees. Erkenntnis. 2000, 53 (3): 285–308. S2CID 170464969. doi:10.1023/A:1026563930319. 
  • Rorty, A.O. Political Sources of Emotions: Greed and Anger. Midwest Studies in Philosophy. 1998, 22: 21–33. doi:10.1111/j.1475-4975.1998.tb00329.x. 
  • Rorty, A.O. The Social and Political Sources of Akrasia. Ethics. July 1997, 107 (4): 644–657. S2CID 154584728. doi:10.1086/233763. 
  • Rorty, A.O. Where Does the Akratic Break Take Place?. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 1980, 58 (4): 333–46. doi:10.1080/00048408012341341. 
  • Santas, G. Aristotle on Practical Inference, the Explanation of Action, and Akrasia. Phronesis. 1969, 14 (2): 162–189. doi:10.1163/156852869X00118. 
  • Santas, G. Plato's Protagoras and Explanations of Weakness. The Philosophical Review. January 1966, 75 (1): 3–33. JSTOR 2183590. doi:10.2307/2183590. 
  • Schorsch, A.J. Housing Policy and Common Sense: An Inquiry and a Method (PDF) Thesis/Dissertation. University of Illinois at Chicago. 1992: 85–90 [2022-12-03]. （原始内容 (PDF)于2022-01-21）. 
  • Searle, J.R. Rationality in Action. Cambridge: MIT Press. 2001. ISBN 978-0-262-19463-1. 
  • Shand, A.F. Attention and Will: A Study in Involuntary Action. Mind. October 1895, 4 (16): 450–471. doi:10.1093/mind/os-4.15.450. 
  • Stroud, Sarah. Weakness of Will. Zalta, Edward N. (编). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Fall. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. 2008 [2022-12-03]. （原始内容于2023-03-06）. 
  • Valverde, M. Diseases of the Will: Alcohol and the Dilemmas of Freedom . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1998. ISBN 978-0-521-62300-1. 
  • Walker, A.F. The Problem of Weakness of Will. Noûs. December 1989, 23 (5): 653–676. JSTOR 2216006. doi:10.2307/2216006. 
  • Wallace, R.J. Three Conceptions of Rational Agency. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. 1999, 2 (3): 217–242. S2CID 141434264. doi:10.1023/A:1009946911117. 
  • Wegner, D.M. Ironic Processes of Mental Control. Psychological Review. 1994, 101 (1): 44–52. PMID 8121959. doi:10.1037/0033-295x.101.1.34. 
  • Wegner, D.M. The Illusion of Conscious Will. Cambridge: MIT Press. 2002. ISBN 978-0-262-23222-7. 
  • Wegner, D.M.; Wheatley, T. Apparent Mental Causation: Sources of the Experience of Will. American Psychologist. July 1999, 54 (7): 480–492. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.188.8271  . PMID 10424155. doi:10.1037/0003-066X.54.7.480. 
  • Williams, B. Voluntary Acts and Responsible Agents. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies. 1990, 10 (1): 1–10. doi:10.1093/ojls/10.1.1. 

十月 20, 2023
意志力薄弱, 希臘語, ἀκρασία, akrasia, 有時音譯為, acrasia, 英語中也作, acrasy, acracy, 是一個古希臘哲學詞彙, 指是缺乏自我控制, 或違背自己的判斷力行事, 參考資料, 编辑adler, akratic, believing, philosophical, studies, july, 2002, s2cid, 189775373, 1023, 1019823330245, arpaly, acting, rationally, against, best, jud. 意志力薄弱 希臘語 ἀkrasia akrasia 有時音譯為 acrasia 英語中也作 acrasy 或 acracy 是一個古希臘哲學詞彙 指是缺乏自我控制 或違背自己的判斷力行事 參考資料 编辑Adler J E Akratic Believing Philosophical Studies July 2002 110 1 1 27 S2CID 189775373 doi 10 1023 A 1019823330245 Arpaly N On Acting Rationally against One s Best Judgement Ethics April 2000 110 3 488 513 S2CID 170712803 doi 10 1086 233321 Arpaly N Schroeder T Praise Blame and the Whole Self Philosophical Studies February 1999 93 2 161 188 S2CID 170234461 doi 10 1023 A 1004222928272 Audi R Weakness of Will and Practical Judgment Nous May 1979 13 2 173 196 JSTOR 2214396 doi 10 2307 2214396 Bovens L The Two Faces of Akratics Anonymous Analysis October 1999 59 4 230 6 doi 10 1111 1467 8284 00174 Cameron M E Akrasia AIDS and Virtue Ethics Journal of Nursing Law 1997 4 1 21 33 PMID 12545981 Campbell P G Diagnosing Agency Philosophy Psychiatry and Psychology June 2000 7 2 107 119 Chan D K Non Intentional Actions American Philosophical Quarterly April 1995 32 2 139 151 Davidson D How is Weakness of the Will Possible Essays on Actions and Events nbsp Oxford Oxford University Press 1980 21 42 Essay first published 1969 ISBN 978 0 19 924626 7 Gilead A How is Akrasia Possible After All Ratio September 1999 12 3 257 270 doi 10 1111 1467 9329 00091 Haggard P Cartledge P Dafydd M Oakley D A Anomalous Control When Free Will is not Conscious Consciousness and Cognition September 2004 13 3 646 654 PMID 15336254 S2CID 5731662 doi 10 1016 j concog 2004 06 001 Haji I Moral Responsibility and the Problem of Induced Pro Attitudes Dialogue Fall 1996 35 4 703 720 S2CID 170293939 doi 10 1017 S0012217300008581 Hardcastle V G Life at the Borders Habits Addictions and Self Control Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 2003 15 2 243 253 S2CID 46625694 doi 10 1080 0952813021000055612 Hartmann D Neurophysiology and Freedom of the Will Poiesis amp Praxis May 2004 2 4 275 284 S2CID 207063367 doi 10 1007 s10202 003 0056 z Harwood Sterling For an Amoral Dispositional Account of Weakness of Will Auslegung 1992 18 1 27 38 reprinted in Harwood Sterling 编 Business as Ethical and Business as Usual Belmont CA Wadsworth Publishing 1996 378 384 Henry D Aristotle on Pleasure and the Worst Form of Akrasia Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 5 3 255 270 September 2002 Hodgson D Plain Person s Free Will Journal of Consciousness Studies January 2005 12 1 3 19 Holton R Intention and Weakness of Will The Journal of Philosophy May 1999 96 5 241 262 CiteSeerX 10 1 1 649 927 nbsp JSTOR 2564667 doi 10 2307 2564667 Hookway C Epistemic Akrasia and Epistemic Virtue Fairweather A Zagzebski L 编 Virtue Epistemology Essays on Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility nbsp Oxford Oxford University Press 2001 178 199 ISBN 978 0 19 514077 4 Jiang X Y What Kind of Knowledge Does a Weak Willed Person Have A Comparative Study of Aristotle and the Ch eng Chu School Philosophy East amp West April 2000 50 2 242 253 Joyce R Early Stoicism and Akrasia Phronesis 1995 40 3 315 335 doi 10 1163 156852895321051874 Martin M W Alcoholism as Sickness and Wrongdoing Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour June 1999 29 2 109 131 doi 10 1111 1468 5914 00094 Mele A R Akrasia Self Control and Second Order Desires Nous September 1992 26 3 281 302 JSTOR 2215955 doi 10 2307 2215955 Mele A R Akratic Feelings Philosophy and Phenomenological Research December 1989 50 2 277 288 JSTOR 2107960 doi 10 2307 2107960 Mele A R Incontinent Believing Philosophical Quarterly April 1986 36 143 212 222 JSTOR 2219769 doi 10 2307 2219769 Mele A R Is Akratic Action Unfree Philosophy and Phenomenological Research June 1986 46 4 673 679 JSTOR 2107677 doi 10 2307 2107677 Mele A R Real Self Deception Behavioral and Brain Sciences March 1997 20 1 91 102 PMID 10096996 S2CID 1701371 doi 10 1017 s0140525x97000034 Metcalfe J Mischel W A Hot Cool System Analysis of Delay of Gratification Dynamics of Willpower Psychological Review January 1999 106 1 3 19 PMID 10197361 doi 10 1037 0033 295X 106 1 3 Owens D Epistemic Akrasia The Monist July 2002 85 3 381 397 doi 10 5840 monist200285316 Peijnenburg J Akrasia Dispositions and Degrees Erkenntnis 2000 53 3 285 308 S2CID 170464969 doi 10 1023 A 1026563930319 Rorty A O Political Sources of Emotions Greed and Anger Midwest Studies in Philosophy 1998 22 21 33 doi 10 1111 j 1475 4975 1998 tb00329 x Rorty A O The Social and Political Sources of Akrasia Ethics July 1997 107 4 644 657 S2CID 154584728 doi 10 1086 233763 Rorty A O Where Does the Akratic Break Take Place Australasian Journal of Philosophy 1980 58 4 333 46 doi 10 1080 00048408012341341 Santas G Aristotle on Practical Inference the Explanation of Action and Akrasia Phronesis 1969 14 2 162 189 doi 10 1163 156852869X00118 Santas G Plato s Protagoras and Explanations of Weakness The Philosophical Review January 1966 75 1 3 33 JSTOR 2183590 doi 10 2307 2183590 Schorsch A J Housing Policy and Common Sense An Inquiry and a Method PDF Thesis Dissertation University of Illinois at Chicago 1992 85 90 2022 12 03 原始内容存档 PDF 于2022 01 21 Searle J R Rationality in Action Cambridge MIT Press 2001 ISBN 978 0 262 19463 1 Shand A F Attention and Will A Study in Involuntary Action Mind October 1895 4 16 450 471 doi 10 1093 mind os 4 15 450 Stroud Sarah Weakness of Will Zalta Edward N 编 The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Fall Metaphysics Research Lab Stanford University 2008 2022 12 03 原始内容存档于2023 03 06 Valverde M Diseases of the Will Alcohol and the Dilemmas of Freedom nbsp Cambridge Cambridge University Press 1998 ISBN 978 0 521 62300 1 含有內容需登入查看的頁面 link Walker A F The Problem of Weakness of Will Nous December 1989 23 5 653 676 JSTOR 2216006 doi 10 2307 2216006 Wallace R J Three Conceptions of Rational Agency Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 1999 2 3 217 242 S2CID 141434264 doi 10 1023 A 1009946911117 Wegner D M Ironic Processes of Mental Control Psychological Review 1994 101 1 44 52 PMID 8121959 doi 10 1037 0033 295x 101 1 34 Wegner D M The Illusion of Conscious Will Cambridge MIT Press 2002 ISBN 978 0 262 23222 7 Wegner D M Wheatley T Apparent Mental Causation Sources of the Experience of Will American Psychologist July 1999 54 7 480 492 CiteSeerX 10 1 1 188 8271 nbsp PMID 10424155 doi 10 1037 0003 066X 54 7 480 Williams B Voluntary Acts and Responsible Agents Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1990 10 1 1 10 doi 10 1093 ojls 10 1 1 取自 https zh wikipedia org w index php title 意志力薄弱 amp oldid 78560220, 维基百科，wiki，书籍，书籍，图书馆，

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